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of Goals, Facts, and Ideology 
Henry J. Aaron 
In 1994, the United States engaged in a great, if confused, national debate on 
how to modify financing and delivery of health care. Despite general satisfac- 
tion with the quality of care they receive, Americans tell poll takers that their 
health care system is badly awry and in need of fundamental change. While in 
seeming agreement that something needs to be done, the public and health care 
experts alike seem confused and divided on just what to do. 
4.1  Why Consensus Is Elusive 
The sources of disagreement are several. First, a major goal of health care- 
the ability to enjoy high-quality life as long as possible-is  not very well de- 
fined and is affected more by the external environment, personal behavior, and 
genetic inheritance than by health care. As a result, discussion of health care 
finance often loses focus when observers  point out-correctly-that  health 
gains from reform  of health  care financing will be small unless  violence  is 
controlled, housing upgraded, diet improved, drug abuse curbed, or some other 
change in the social environment or personal behavior achieved. It is certainly 
likely that such steps would improve health more than would reform of health 
care, and such reforms are important for other reasons as well. Furthermore, 
the concept of “high-quality life” is multifaceted. How large are benefits from 
cure of somatic disease if  people live in dreadful  conditions or suffer from 
other devastating diseases? The question  takes on particular  force when  so- 
matic illnesses result from personal actions-smoking,  substance abuse, reck- 
less driving, hunting, or poor diet. 
Thus, debates about health care financing slide easily into a host of related 
questions concerning human behavior. But they are not what reform of health 
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care financing is about. Coherent consideration  of health care financing re- 
quires that most of these issues be left for separate consideration.  It also re- 
quires an  awareness  that  health  care serves  important  purposes  other than 
purely medical ends, such as providing care and comfort during travail  and, 
most notably, at life’s two momentous  transitions, birth and death. As Victor 
R. Fuchs (1979) observed, physicians and other health providers now perform 
important functions once the responsibility of the family or organized religion. 
A second obstacle to the achievement of consensus on reform of health care 
financing  arises  from  disagreements over  the  proper  realms of  individual 
choice and of social intervention. Once again, health status depends on many 
behaviors that are clearly the responsibility of individuals, not society. In addi- 
tion, people disagree on whether health care is primarily a commodity, similar 
to VCRs and restaurant  dinners, the allocation of  which  capitalist  societies 
leave to individual choice, or more like voting and elementary and secondary 
education, the entitlement to which is a right of citizenship. Two decades ago, 
Arthur  Okun (1  975) noted that standard economic theory  easily shows that 
welfare would be increased  if people could sell votes or if military draftees 
could pay others to serve in their stead. Similar arguments can be adduced that 
people should be permitted to buy or sell organs for transplant. In each case, 
it is argued that a willing buyer and a willing seller will carry out a transaction 
only if it makes each of them better off. Yet such behavior is explicitly prohib- 
ited by law because of a widely shared belief that some things should not be 
bought or sold, but enforced as inalienable rights or obligations. 
Thus, some observers  hold  that  society may have an obligation  to ensure 
that people can buy insurance at actuarially fair prices (with associated subsid- 
ies for the poor, elderly, or chronically  ill, as deemed necessary), but that no 
further collective obligation exists. For them, the goal of  reform of health care 
financing is to remove alleged shortcomings in the market for insurance.’ 
Others hold that public policy  should ensure access to health  services at 
prices no greater than sufficient to deter utterly frivolous use. This result can 
be achieved through direct public financing or private insurance-with  limited 
copayments, deductibles, or coinsurance in either case. Private insurance can 
achieve universality, however, only if  subsidies  make it affordable for those 
with low incomes and if individuals or their employers (or both) are required to 
buy insurance, a step regarded as unnecessary or harmful by those concerned 
primarily with access to insurance. 
A third  obstacle to consensus is the pace of change in the technology  of 
insurance, health care, and organization of delivery. Insurers are increasingly 
adept in using  statistical techniques to identify individuals  and groups with 
high expected health care costs. Biomedical research is beginning to identify 
1. I use the mushy term “shortcomings,” rather than the standard economists’ term “imperfec- 
tions,” because some observers are concerned about asymmetric information and the possibility of 
instability or failure of insurance markets, while other observers are even more upset about the 
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genetic markers that predict predispositions  to develop specific diseases. The 
power and accuracy of these procedures can only increase, perhaps very fast. 
These techniques have created one of the few areas of consensus in the debate 
about health care reform-an  understanding of the perniciousness of untram- 
meled risk selection and unlimited underwriting by insurers. These techniques 
promise-or  threaten, depending on one’s point of view-to  convert health 
insurance into a form of prepayment. 
The advances in the technology of health care are even more dramatic than 
the progress in risk selection. Some of this progress rests on hardware, some 
on pharmaceutical products, and some on clinical technique. The net effect is 
to cause frequent changes in recommended courses of therapy for major dis- 
eases. 
An additional dimension of change concerns the organization of the market 
for health care. Partly under pressure to control costs and partly from efforts 
to anticipate the future consequences of legislation, physicians, hospitals, and 
insurers are merging, reorganizing, and regrouping. How these efforts will af- 
fect the delivery and cost of care remains obscure, but they have sown uncer- 
tainty among providers and insurers regarding the future. 
Confronted with this dynamism, some observers focus on health care deliv- 
ery and financing as they stand, some on projections of the directions in which 
arrangements are evolving. The former group tends to see some problems but 
no crisis. Costs are high, but areas for achieving economies exist. Some people 
are uninsured, but the number can be reduced. Quality of care is high on the 
average. Sometimes physicians intervene too early and too much, and some- 
times they do too little, often because uninsured patients come too late for care. 
The group that attends to projections of risk selection and health technology 
is prone to see crisis. They see current trends leading to reduced coverage, to 
much increased expenditures on low-benefit care, and to deterioration in qual- 
ity from poorly designed efforts to control spending. Technological dynamism 
creates continuing pressures on costs, which in turn generate behaviors by indi- 
viduals, businesses,  and governments that tend to narrow insurance coverage 
and access to care. Whether the reactions of public and private payers to rising 
costs will suffice to squeeze out low-benefit, high-cost care remains a matter 
of hot dispute. 
4.2  A Few Facts 
Against this background, several key facts-and  disagreements about some 
of them-help  explain why agreement on how to reform health care financing 
has proven so elusive. 
Fact 1. Annual health care outlays are highly concentrated, with  1% of the 
population accounting for roughly 30% and 5% of the population accounting 
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of the simple truth that most people are healthy most of the time and healthy 
people consume little health care. This spending pattern holds in several coun- 
tries for which data are available. 
Fact 2. Health care technology is advancing rapidly. The degree to which sci- 
entific advances  improve the quality  of care varies  across both technologies 
and patients. Typically, new medical technologies improve the diagnostic accu- 
racy or therapeutic efficacy for many patients but are used on many other pa- 
tients  where the medical value is questionable.  Thus, new technologies im- 
prove the quality of care for some patients and may extend the quantity of care 
by enabling diagnosis or treatment of patients for whom nothing similar could 
be done previously.* They also tend to be used wastefully on other patients. 
The long-term value of new technologies is difficult to appraise because they 
are used not only for current patient care but also as part of ongoing research. 
Part of the value of medical advance is its role in undergirding further research 
on new methods of patient care. 
It is commonplace, even among economists, to note that advances in medi- 
cal technology, unlike advances in other fields, have not reduced costs. While 
commonplace, this statement  reflects  muddled  thought. First,  scientific  ad- 
vance has not led to reduced “costs” in many fields, at least if the term “cost” 
is used, as in the case of medical care, to refer to total spending. Technological 
advance tends to reduce price, but not necessarily total spending. The price of 
a floating-point operation has plummeted, but total expenditures on computers 
have skyrocketed. The quality-adjusted price of automobiles has fallen relative 
to the price of most other goods, but total spending on automobiles  has in- 
creased. 
In  the case of  health  care, we simply do not know  whether  the price  of 
quality-adjusted  medical services has risen or fallen (Aaron 199 1; Newhouse 
1992). No good definition of  health outputs exists. In the absence of such a 
measure and in the face of revolutionary changes in the methods of care-that 
is, in the unit of output-no  meaningful price index is possible. Common price 
indices that indicate that health prices have risen faster than other prices are 
2. Total outlays have risen not only because medical advances make possible the treatment of 
previously untreatable conditions, but also because these advances often reduce contraindications 
for therapy and thereby increase the number of patients for whom the costbenefit ratio of  treat- 
ment or diagnosis is favorable. Furthermore, successful mediczl interventions raise total spending 
also because they often spare people low-cost deaths who then survive to absorb really expensive 
care for chronic illnesses-that  is, for diseases that are not immediately lethal but for which the 
only available care is palliative or supportive but not necessarily cheap-or  they make possible 
treatments that are curative but often very costly. Antibiotics illustrate these phenomena. They 
have slashed mortality and morbidity from infectious diseases among children and young adults, 
thereby sparing them to live until they can generate really large medical bills. They have sharply 
reduced the incidence among the elderly of pneumonia, once called “the widow’s friend.” And 
they have made possible aggressive and costly cancer therapies that ravage defenses against poten- 
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close to meaningless.’ Whether health prices really have risen faster than other 
prices, not as fast, or have actually fallen remains quite unclear. This uncer- 
tainty  is heightened by  the sharp declines in length of hospital stays and the 
dramatic shifts of therapy from inpatient to outpatient care. 
Fact 3. Every rich nation socializes the financing of health care in two senses. 
Sick patients and their families are spared most of the cost of care when ill. In 
addition, the actual cost of health care is only loosely related to outlays ex- 
pected ex ante. Some countries socialize costs through public finance, some 
through private insurance. Socialization is less in the United States than else- 
where, in part because the United States covers a smaller share of costs through 
public  budgets  than do other countries,  but  even more  importantly  because 
private financing is largely experience rated. 
Fact 4. Alone among rich nations, the United States imposes no effective con- 
straint on outlays of hospitals, the locus of  most acute-care health spending. 
The U.S. system of financing health care is perfused  with moral hazard and 
attendant incentives for economic waste. While moral hazard is inescapable if 
patients bear little cost for care when ill and particularly if providers are paid 
on a fee-for-service basis, other countries limit moral hazard by  some combi- 
nation of budget and fee controls or pay providers through salary or capitation. 
These four facts taken together explain why health care spending is so much 
higher in the United States than elsewhere and why it is rising so fast. The U.S. 
financing system encourages patients to seek care whenever medical benefits 
are deemed to be positive (some would say “nonnegative”). Rapid technologi- 
cal advance continuously and rapidly lengthens the menu of beneficial inter- 
ventions. In both of these respects, the United States does not differ from other 
rich nations. The United States is unique, however, in that its reimbursement 
system encourages providers to render all beneficial care and perhaps more 
besides. This system might not lead to waste, but two conditions necessary for 
efficient decentralized decision making are not satisfied. 
Fact 5. Households face incentives to purchase excessive health insurance. In 
addition, households would be unable to make rational decisions about either 
the quantity or kind of health care even if they did not buy excessive health 
insurance. Economists universally accept the first of these statements. The ex- 
clusion of employer-financed health insurance from personal income and pay- 
roll  taxes means  that,  at any  given level of earnings,  a dollar of additional 
health insurance reduces income available for other consumption by less than 
3. The consumer price index (CPI) for health, for example, weights hospital service and dental 
services similarly, although total spending on hospital services greatly exceeds that on dental ser- 
vices.  What  counts for the CPI is consumer spending. Since third-party  payments cover most 
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one dollar, according to Martin Feldstein ( 1973).4  Feldstein also observes that 
the resulting incentives encourage the purchase of insurance with inefficiently 
small deductibles and other cost sharing.  Fuchs (1979) has suggested that 
people overinsure for an additional  reason-to  escape the need to face the 
kinds of marginal calculations they normally make during ordinary economic 
life. 
The second of these statements provokes widespread opposition among gen- 
eral economists and some health economists as well, although I believe that 
except for professional economists few would regard it as other than a banal 
truth. The reasons can be stated in economic terms. As with many complex 
goods, laypersons lack expert knowledge about the indications for or the value 
of various health care services. Accordingly, they hire experts-that  is, physi- 
cians or other health professionals-to  provide advice and, in many situations, 
to make actual decisions for them.s In principle, healthy people could write 
contingent contracts specifying the care they want when ill. 
Two facts render such contracts chimerical. First, the technical complexity 
of defining the physical effect of particular diagnostic or therapeutic interven- 
tions is so multifaceted that it is impossible to write a contingent contract in- 
structing providers regarding  what rational people-healthy  or sick-would 
want when sick. Approximately ten thousand separately defined medical diag- 
noses exist. Many of these conditions can appear in varying degrees of severity. 
With respect to each of these diagnoses, patients can present with widely vary- 
ing  conditions, complicating conditions, history  of  treatment.  In  addition, 
treatment options for many conditions vary, and the medical outcomes depend 
on severity, patient history, and complicating conditions. Thus, a complete con- 
tract would have to deal, literally, with millions of contingencies. Further com- 
plicating the situation is the matter of cost-treatments  differ widely in cost. 
Finally, the impressive technological  dynamism of medicine means that the 
contract would have to be rewritten in significant ways almost continuously if 
patients are not to be trapped in obsolete contracts. 
A second consideration indicates why contingent contracts for medical care 
would be of doubtful usefulness even if they could be written. The expected 
utility of medical services depends on actual health status and on random ex- 
ternal events, such as whether one’s spouse has died or grandchildren arrive in 
one’s life. Thus, the utility of health services for the sick may differ from the 
healthy person’s expectation of the utility  of such services. In recognition of 
4.  This statement is false for the narrow range over which the earned income tax credit is rising 
and  exceeds  the  payroll  tax  and  personal  income  tax  rates  are  zero.  The  standard  work  is 
Feldstein (1973). 
5. Physicians suggest that surrendering such decision-making functions is therapeutic for the 
patient. When made by  practicing physicians, this statement emits an aroma of  self-service and 
self-glorification. One physician, who was accustomed to making all medical decisions himself, 
described  the process by  which, when ill, he  surrendered such decision  making to others and 
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this possibility, durable powers of attorney and advance medical directives are 
subject to repeal on the slightest of indications by their authors at any time and 
under any circumstances. As Thomas Schelling (1984) has observed, reconcil- 
ing conflicting preferences of a single person at different times and under dif- 
ferent circumstances raises problems of incommensurability  similar to those 
raised by interpersonal comparisons of utility. 
Thus, people must cede to professionals detailed decisions on medical treat- 
ment. But even decisions on how much to spend on insurance and hence on 
the volume of resources available to professionals is likely to be flawed. The 
probability of most major medical events is quite low during the usual periods 
over which insurance contracts are written. The evidence that individuals have 
flawed perceptions of low-probability events is overwhelming. Thus, a strong 
possibility  exists  that  people  will  attach  irrational  weights  to  the  low- 
probability events that account for most acute-care outlays. Economists should 
recognize that, given choices about the risks against which to insure and the 
degree of protection to purchase, many people will choose unwisely. 
4.3  The Way We Are 
As far as the financing of health care is concerned, “the U.S.  system” is a 
misnomer. The congeries of financing arrangements by which payments flow 
to health care providers reflects ancillary consequences of policies adopted for 
reasons having little or nothing to do with health care and the more or less 
independent actions of governments, religious organizations and other charit- 
ies,  and  private  businesses  and  individuals.  These  arrangements  are  ill- 
coordinated and disorganized. Except under the most Panglossian presumption 
that whatever is must be best, these arrangements would never be accorded any 
presumption of efficiency. This state is not the well-ordered cacophony of a 
normal economic market, but the chaos of uncoordinated  actions by people 
and groups that are heedless of effects on third parties. 
4.3.1 
Irrationalities in wage controls during World War I1 gave employer-financed 
health insurance its initial push. The cost of health insurance  was excluded 
from wartime limits on compensation,  enabling employers to raise workers’ 
pay without running afoul of wartime controls. The exclusion of employer pay- 
ments for health insurance from taxable compensation under the personal in- 
come tax and the payroll tax reinforced and perpetuated the linkage of insur- 
ance to work in the post-World  War I1 period. 
The McCarren-Ferguson  Act  entrusted  insurance regulation  to the states. 
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act  (ERISA) then blocked  state 
regulation of self-insured health plans. It thereby encouraged self-insurance, 
which is simply workplace-based experience rating. More than half of those 
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insured through work now receive coverage through self-insured plans, and the 
proportion is rising. 
This system has  the  virtue  of  encouraging  employers  to pay  attention  to 
workers’ health and working conditions, but it creates two serious problems. 
First, it encourages discrimination in hiring on the basis of age, race, sex, and 
disability status that civil rights statutes go to great lengths to prohibit. Second, 
relative to individual underwriting, it also significantly mutes workers’ finan- 
cial interest in their own health. Community rating deals with the first problem, 
and does essentially nothing to aggravate the second. Individual underwriting 
deals with the second problem, but drastically increases sales and administra- 
tive costs. For these and other reasons, I believe that community rating within 
no more than a small number of distinct categories is more efficient than exten- 
sive experience rating (Aaron 1994). 
Public health  care programs,  particularly  the  federal-state  Medicaid  pro- 
gram, likewise display unmistakable  signs of accident and caprice. Because 
Medicaid eligibility is tied in part to the design and generosity of Aid to Fami- 
lies with Dependent Children and of  Supplemental Security Income, people 
who are eligible in one state would be ineligible in another. Medicaid pays 
for services of podiatrists, chiropractors, and Christian Science practitioners in 
some states but not in others. Some states limit hospitalization  while others 
do not. Physician and hospital fees differ widely. Distinct and uncoordinated 
programs cover Native Americans, the military, families of the military, veter- 
ans, and federal employees. 
Other historical circumstances  have led to enormous variation  in the way 
health care is delivered across the United States. While it is barely conceivable 
that the differences reflect differences in tastes and resource costs and avail- 
ability, no one familiar with the delivery system believes that. Hospital lengths 
of stay differ markedly across the United States. The incidence of many medi- 
cal procedures differs across states and smaller areas in ways epidemiological 
or demographic factors cannot explain. The penetration of health maintenance 
organizations (HMOs) ranges from dominance in Hawaii, through significant 
penetration in the western states, Minnesota, and Massachusetts, to negligible 
in much of the rest of  the United States. Currently, the organization of physi- 
cians, connections between hospitals and physicians, and linkage among hos- 
pitals are undergoing tumultuous change. Given the long history of efforts by 
various groups in medicine to cultivate and defend rents, I believe one should 
harbor little hope that the current ferment will push the system to a social op- 
timum. 
Huge international variations in the staffing of health care systems also raise 
serious questions about the efficiency of organization of health care provision. 
In  1980, the United States employed 2.8 nurses  for each physician, Canada 
4.4, Germany 1.4, and Belgium 0.3 (Parkin, McGuire, and Yule 1987). While 
these data are stale, they differ so widely that it is virtually impossible to imag- 
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4.3.2  Institutional Failures 
Because the financing of health care in the United States reflects countless 
independent decisions, many made for reasons having little or nothing to do 
with health, significant institutional failures should surprise no one. 
Insurance. Insurance markets are failing for several distinct reasons. First, ad- 
vances in risk analysis based on both statistics and biology are narrowing the 
scope of true insurance, as steadily increasing proportions of the variance in 
future use of  medical services can be predicted on the basis of characteristics 
of the insured at the time the insurance contract is written. These characteris- 
tics include  age, race,  sex, disability  status, occupation,  place  of residence, 
marital status, sexual orientation, and, most notably, past use of medical ser- 
vices. 
Such information  creates a serious  problem  whether or not  it  is  equally 
available to the insured and the insurer. If no information  asymmetries exist, 
then insurance becomes prepayment, transforming poor health prospects from 
bad fortune into a negative  dowry, a lump-sum charge against personal net 
worth. This problem declines as the duration of insurance contracts increases, 
but so long as premiums reflect all available information,  it remains even if a 
lifelong contract is mandated at conception, since health background and lon- 
gevity of one’s parents, siblings, aunts, and uncles are correlated with one’s 
own subsequent health and longevity. If the insurer is less well informed than 
the insured, adverse selection and its attendant problems arise. As Stiglitz and 
Rothschild  ( 1976) showed, a sustainable insurance market equilibrium may 
not exist, and complete market failure is possible. As the capacity of insurers 
to predict use of health care services improves, the variance in underwritten 
rates increases, and the likelihood that those most likely to use health care will 
find insurance attractive declines. 
Aid for poor sick people, whether privately or publicly funded, discourages 
people with low actual or expected incomes from buying insurance because 
they can count on subsidies when ill.(‘ Rich nations without exception provide 
such help on the principle  that at least some forms of health care should be 
available whether the recipient can afford it or not and sometimes whether the 
recipient  wants it or not. Thus, public  and private programs  discourage the 
poor from buying insurance privately, at the same time that tax rules encourage 
those who face positive personal income or payroll tax rates to buy too much 
insurance. 
Market or  Budget Discipline. Those who provide health care services face little 
economic discipline  in the United  States. The fact that insurance, public  or 
6. Several comments during the discussion of  Alan Garber’s paper (chap. 5 in  this volume) 
remarked that the availability of  Medicaid makes the purchase of private insurance for the costs 
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private, makes patients insensitive to costs is well known among economists, 
at least since the seminal article by Arrow (1963) and the comment by Pauly 
( 1968), which characterized  this insensitivity  as “moral hazard.”  Physicians 
and other health professionals  would simply be instruments  for effectuating 
this moral hazard if they acted as perfect agents for patients. In fact, the fee- 
for-service reimbursement  system creates strong incentives for providers  to 
increase the problem, as the literature on physician-induced demand strongly, 
if inconclusively, suggests (Cromwell and Mitchell  1986; Fuchs 1986; Phelps 
1986). 
Theory suggests that such a payment system will produce waste-the  pur- 
chase of services worth less to the user and (in the absence of significant exter- 
nalities) to society than they cost society. The extent of such waste depends on 
the  shape of benefits curves associated  with the menu of  available medical 
technologies.  Concave  benefits curves  will be associated  with  considerable 
waste; convex curves with less. I know of no good research on how much of 
current medical spending represents waste in this sense. Although it is tempt- 
ing to conclude that an increase in the number of available procedures and of 
outlays  will  be associated  with  increased waste,  I know  of  no  analysis  on 
whether waste in this sense is increasing or decreasing.  Personal experiences 
and studies of selected procedures suggest that waste is large. Brook and Vai- 
ana ( 1989) have suggested that some procedures may be inappropriately used 
in as many as 30% of applications and that their use is equivocal in a similar 
proportion of cases.’ One recent experiment dealt a body blow to this line of 
reasoning, however. One of the procedures found by Brook and Vaiana (1989) 
to be useless, or equivocal in half or more of all cases, was carotid endarterec- 
tomy, the surgical removal of fatty deposits from the carotid artery to minimize 
chances of stroke. The managers of a controlled experiment to test the efficacy 
of this procedure not only did not confirm this judgment, but felt obliged to 
terminate the experiment because the results indicated such large and positive 
results  that  failure to communicate the  findings  immediately to physicians 
would constitute an indefensible disservice to patients (Altman 1994). 
The practical question is how best to reduce such waste. At first blush, it 
might seem that if households faced the full price of insurance (that is, if  the 
tax distortions were repealed), the price constraints created by the requirement 
that insurers make nonnegative profits to remain in business would establish 
the requisite incentives. 
This outcome requires that the regulatory powers exercised by insurers ex- 
actly offset waste from moral hazard. This result is unlikely because of multi- 
ple agency problems connecting patients to insurers, patients to providers, and 
insurers to providers. Physicians, in particular, are trained to act as agents for 
patients and to assure that they receive all medically beneficial care. They are 
7. Whether “inappropriate” and “equivocal” imply “harmful,” ‘‘useless,” or “low-benefit’’ is un- 
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not trained to weight costs against benefits, but to weigh benefits from action 
versus benefits from inaction. Even if the agency problems are solved, a deeper 
problem remains: since patients may regard as suboptimal the contracts they 
signed when well, accurate enforcement of these contracts by agents trying to 
effectuate the interests of the healthy purchasers of insurance may act in ways 
contrary to the revised preferences of the sick. Whose life is it anyway? 
According to Aaron and Schwartz (1984), physical  constraints can force 
physicians to use available resources to achieve highest medical benefits. Thus, 
limits on the availability of operating rooms or diagnostic or therapeutic radio- 
logical  equipment can  cause those responsible  for  managing these  capital 
goods to ration efficiently. Much the same is true if hospitals work with sala- 
ried staff in critical specialities, such as cardiac surgery. In these cases, provid- 
ers work at full capacity but cannot care for everyone, and medical ethics align 
well with social objectives of using available resources to produce highest net 
benefits. While such a happy result is possible, it is by no means assured unless 
good information on outcomes of interventions is available and widely dissem- 
inated and unless regulations or incentives make it costly to practice in viola- 
tion of this information. Incentives created by limits on general medical sup- 
plies  and pharmaceutical  products  are much less likely to produce  efficient 
outcomes, because monitoring physician behavior in the countless small deci- 
sions comprised in normal care is probably  impossible,  and each physician 
faces a conflict between obligations to specific patients and diffuse obligations 
to see that total resources are efficiently used.* 
Since capital equipment typically is purchased by provider groups, effective 
control over the purchase  of such equipment when numerous payers  are in- 
volved requires that each payer establish enforceable rules limiting access to 
such equipment similar to those that would arise under supply constraints. But 
it is not at all clear how they would go about doing so, particularly since physi- 
cians control the flow of information to the insurer. 
Once again, prepaid health plans seem to provide the incentives for insurers 
to allocate  resources  efficiently. But  serious obstacles  stand in the way.  The 
low quality  of information makes it difficult to write clear and enforceable 
guidelines for when to use various medical procedures. 
Research. Medical research, like much other research, ranges from fundamen- 
tal science to highly applied product and device development. At the funda- 
mental end of the spectrum, serious public good issues have led the United 
States to underwrite basic biomedical research through government grants and 
8. At one time, the British rationed dialysis by limiting the availability of dialysis machines. The 
primary criterion for rationing was age, with occasional exceptions based on other considerations. 
According to medical testimony, this method of rationing was reasonably efficient. The ability to 
limit  dialysis  diminished  when  continuous  ambulatory  peritoneal  dialysis  (CAPD) replaced 
machine-based  dialysis, because  the supplies necessary  for CAPD were less easily  monitored 
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direct  research  (principally  through  the  National  Institutes  of  Health)  and 
through private foundations, the largest of which is the Hughes Foundation. At 
the applied end of the spectrum, most research is camed  out by pharmaceutical 
companies and device manufacturers. These two forms of research are comple- 
ments. 
Current arrangements  for financing applied research  may  not rise  (or de- 
scend) to the level of market failure, but they are peculiar. A crude character- 
ization of current arrangements would be the following: Entrepreneurs invest 
in a company that sells products and uses the profits from current sales to fund 
many diverse research projects, most of which will fail. Patents on the few that 
succeed enable monopoly pricing, the profits from which are then used to fund 
further diverse research projects, most of which will fail. But some succeed, 
and patents on them permit monopoly pricing, the profits from which . . . And 
so on, ad infinitum. 
Thus, the funds to pay for applied research  come from the relatively  few 
patients who benefit from the fruits of past research. This crude characteriza- 
tion is inaccurate in one important detail. While the patients who consume the 
products  of  past  research  pay  for future research  through  drug prices  well 
above production  cost,9 third parties-private  insurers and government pro- 
grams-pay  for many of these products. To the extent that third parties pay for 
these products, the cost of future research is effectively socialized. To the ex- 
tent that patients bear the costs, however, the allocation of the cost of research 
raises troubling questions because vulnerable people are required  to pay far 
more than production costs for drugs and devices that are indispensable. Inevi- 
tably, some potential  users  find the costs insupportable and fail to buy  im- 
portant or even vital products because the price exceeds production cost. 
This possibility is the legitimate basis for concern about high drug prices. 
This concern  has triggered  various proposals  to curb drug prices  that raise 
serious problems of their own, because the limits threaten the profit base on 
which much applied research rests. According to Linda Cohen and Roger No11 
(1991), since the  public  record  in  supporting  applied  research  is poor,  in- 
creased government support could not effectively replace any curtailment  of 
private research support. 
4.4  The Elusive Prize of Health Care Financing Reform 
Public opinion polls report that Americans think something is fundamentally 
wrong  with  the U.S. health  care system. A highly  articulate  president  with 
unmatched capacity to explain complex issues in simple terms made reform 
of  health care financing his  major domestic initiative. The president’s party 
9. They also pay for high total profit margins and associated dividends and appreciation and for 
large outlays on sales and advertising to promote product differentiation and  associated profit 
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controlled both  houses  of  Congress. Yet  the  effort to  enact major  reform 
failed utterly. Whether one of  the  more  limited  proposals  cobbled together 
as the  1994 legislative calendar moved to its close would have been passed 
if the administration had embraced it earlier will occupy doctoral students for 
years. 
Why the 103d Congress ended without major legislation demands attention. 
Was the explanation bad staff work and political maladroitness?  Did the ad- 
ministration  do about as well as possible given the forces that it confronted? 
Or were serious mistakes committed on behalf of a cause that in any case had 
little chance of success? Are future efforts to reach consensus likely to fare 
better than those of the Clinton administration? 
I shall present a number of interrelated arguments, none of which is capable 
of being tested definitively with the techniques economists are trained to use 
and to trust. These arguments cannot be so tested because each is created to 
correlate with  observed  facts. This is data mining  in its most  fundamental 
sense. 
In any democracy, times when it is possible to pass legislation restructuring 
a tenth or more of the economy are exceedingly rare. No such time has oc- 
curred in all U.S.  history, except under  the exigencies  of  war. We are not 
currently living in such a time. The willingness to contemplate far-reaching 
legislative change requires either extreme duress (devastation from war or 
economic collapse) or a high order of faith that leaders are trustworthy and 
capable. Neither condition is currently satisfied. 
Despite diffuse agreement on the need for major changes in the system and 
on the  specific goals  of  reform, no consensus exists  on the weights  that 
should be attached to the various goals of reform or on how best to achieve 
those goals. 
Key underlying facts about the delivery of health care are in dispute or are 
unknown. Relevant facts include both actual, potentially observable behavior 
and estimates of how people will change behavior if incentives are modified. 
Given large vistas of ignorance and complexity, people take intellectual and 
political refuge in ideology, which I define for current purposes as presump- 
tions about group and individual behavior that are weakly supported but can 
be overridden, at best only with powerful evidence and sometimes not even 
then. 
The tenth or more of the economy that is the subject of health care reform is 
extraordinarily messy and complicated. The result of this heterogeneity is an 
inescapable dilemma.  A proposal for sweeping reform must be bewilderingly 
complex; or, if it is simple, it will produce highly disparate effects in various 
parts of this enormously diverse nation. Moreover, reforms that extend ser- 
vices  to some people must  produce  large numbers  of  losers-those  who 
must pay higher taxes if  spending is increased, or those whose services or 
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able models, little cleverness is needed to identify the losers and use them as 
a cudgel to beat the proponents of change. 
4.5  The Many Faces of Hubris 
Economists, political scientists, and others who try to analyze public policy 
are trained to look at large trends and major problems, not to focus on uninfor- 
mative specificity. To deal at the macro level requires abstraction and general- 
ization, a suppression of detail in order to highlight the structure of the problem 
at hand. Students of economic regulation, for example, examine the emergence 
in many domains of certain behavioral regularities-for  example, the tendency 
for regulatory capture or the inefficiencies from use of process rules rather than 
outcome  standards. On the basis of  such accumulated insight, analysts who 
know practically nothing about an industry can effectively criticize the deci- 
sions of people who spend their lives studying and regulating the industry. Few 
economists know much about how products move by barge, for example; but 
their ignorance does not materially impair their analyses of policies of the In- 
terstate Commerce Commission. 
Disregard for “irrelevant” detail permits policy analysts to approach public 
policy much like students in a military academy who analyze Lee’s strategy at 
Gettysburg. They model  the terrain, place the forces in their respective loca- 
tions, move stick figures around, comment on how they might have acted, and 
reach conclusions  about alternative strategies. It is all so intellectually  chal- 
lenging, so stimulating,  to think that one is mentally  replaying  an event  in 
which tens of thousands of soldiers died. And it is so exhilarating to imagine 
the reconfiguration of  an industry  through which  close to $1  trillion  of re- 
sources flow, to dream of making the world a better place by designing a supe- 
rior system of paying for health care. It is so intoxicating, in fact, that one can 
easily forget  the herculean  labor necessary  in a democracy to  bring  about 
large-scale changes in social policy and institutions. 
This mental numbing is doubly important, as in the case of  the U.S. health 
care system, when the object being manipulated is extremely diverse and com- 
plicated  in relevant  ways. Thus, reformers  must beware of a kind of  policy 
makers’ narcosis, a condition in which pride (often  justified) about the power 
of one’s analytical skills deadens awareness of the distinction between, for ex- 
ample, talking about cutting spending by $100 billion and the practical steps 
necessary to make such changes happen. Between what one person has called 
“Lotus policy analysis” and real change lies the task of writing legislation and 
regulations,  securing popular acceptance of proposed actions, setting up new 
agencies, hiring staff, and, among other things, causing half a million doctors 
to practice medicine differently from ways learned in medical school and re- 
peated for years or even decades. 
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who hope to enact a single major law that will  reform  the U.S.  health care 
system. With the exception of war mobilization and the desperate measures of 
the Great Depression, U.S. history contains no example of legislation remotely 
approaching the ambition and complexity  of major reform of health care fi- 
nancing and the magnitude of change in behavior and established institutions it 
requires. Legislation creating land grant colleges and Social Security produced 
enormous ramifications,  but  modified  or replaced  few  existing  institutions. 
Economic regulation,  which  intrudes  in  much  of  the U.S.  economy,  arose 
piecemeal over many years. 
In  short, the disproportion  between  easy talk of fundamentally reforming 
health  care finance, a mode of discourse abetted by  the rhetorical  habits of 
scholars, and the magnitude  and complexity of the task of reforming  health 
care financing is grotesque. The most  surprising aspect of the  debate about 
health care reform is not that consensus has been so elusive but that anyone 
ever expected it. The most disappointing aspect of the debate was the operation 
of a political Gresham’s law, with epithets, oversimplification, and plain lying 
driving out serious debate over the complex issues that might have enlightened 
the electorate, even if it did not persuade their elected representatives to act. 
4.6  Goals and Weights 
The goals of health care reform, like Caesar’s Gaul, are divided into three 
parts: cost control, extension of insurance coverage, and maintenance or im- 
provement of quality of care. If  the delivery system were thought to be effi- 
cient, the inconsistency of these goals would be transparent. 
But few would place efficiency among the many virtues of the US. health 
care  system.  A  large  theoretical  and  empirical  literature,  supported-one 
might  almost  say, made unnecessary-by  every observer’s personal experi- 
ences testifies to widespread inefficiencies. Moral hazard induced by insurance 
under a fee-for-service  system causes consumption of much health care with 
lower social benefit than social cost. Flaws in the tax system lead to excessive 
insurance. Both of those factors reduce incentives for providers to operate ef- 
ficiently. Eliminating or reducing these inefficiencies would assuredly release 
resources that could be diverted to those whose access to care is now inhibited 
by a lack of good insurance. 
4.6.1  Goal Trade-offs 
Not  only  goals  but  weights  attached  to  various  goals  differ.  Inevitably 
choices must be made about how aggressively to pursue cost control, how far 
and how fast to extend financial access, and how much quality to seek. 
The relationship  between efficiency and quality is particularly  subtle. The 
term “waste” for economists encompasses two phenomena:  use of resources 
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duction  methods  that generate  costs but  no added  benefits-and  use of  re- 
sources to produce services that generate benefits worth less, in some sense, 
than they cost. 
Elimination of the first form of waste reduces costs and, since some care is 
harmful, may even improve quality of care in the short run. Elimination of low- 
benefit, high-cost care lowers quality of care as the term is commonly used, 
because such economies deny to some patients care they would choose to have 
under current financing arrangements. 
In the long run, however, eliminating both kinds of waste threatens quality 
of care. Expenditures on research and development of new medical procedures 
respond to potential sales. The elimination of waste lowers potential sales and 
thereby discourages profit-motivated research. Over the long run, eliminating 
waste is likely to reduce the flow of innovation.'" Whether a reduction in inno- 
vation is to be celebrated (because innovation widens the scope of moral haz- 
ard and, therefore, of economic waste) or decried (because large serendipitous 
advances may be lost), is one of many important unknowable matters in medi- 
cal financing. 
Even if waste is extensive, savings may not be large enough, or may not be 
realizable  quickly  enough, to pay for the costs of  extending  access without 
short-run loss of some beneficial care, quite apart from any long-term retarda- 
tion of medical advance. 
4.6.2  Weights 
variety of latent goals. 
Among advocates of access, cost control, and quality one can identify a wide 
Advocates  for  the  poor,  including  many  of  the  long-time  supporters  of 
government-sponsored  health insurance, attach dominant weight to univer- 
sal access. 
Business  supporters of government involvement  in health care seem moti- 
vated  mostly by concern about controlling growth of costs. They  seem to 
believe that private agents, acting alone, cannot solve problems of moral haz- 
ard-problems  they see growing as the menu of diagnostic and therapeutic 
tools lengthens. 
Many observers, including representatives from the medical community, ac- 
knowledge that lack of financial access and rising costs are serious problems 
but dwell on the high quality of currently available care and warn that efforts 
to extend access and cut costs could impair quality, if not immediately, then 
over time. 
10. One needs to be cautious in making such forecasts, as the essence of research is identifica- 
tion  of unexpected production possibilities. To  the extent that research activities are shaped by 
opportunities and incentives, the transformation of the financial environment for medical services 
into one that rewards parsimony might produce startling results, such as the discovery of low-cost 
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More generally, many participants in the health care reform debate deny that 
curtailments in the growth of spending may necessitate trade-offs among de- 
sired ends. 
4.7  Ignorance 
When a member of Congress asked Congressional Budget Office director 
Robert  Reischauer  whether  he was confident that the CBO estimates of the 
cost of President Clinton’s health reform proposal were “in the right ballpark,” 
Reischauer responded, “I am pretty sure they are in the same city the ballpark 
is in.” II This exchange crystallized the extraordinary  uncertainty  surrounding 
the debate about health care reform-not  just about the president’s plan, but 
about any proposal for far-reaching reform. 
4.7.1  Facts and Behavior 
Reliable  predictions  of the consequences of  major reforms of health care 
financing are simply impossible because information on actual use of health 
care services is spotty and out of date, and understanding of how people will 
respond to changed incentives is appallingly inadequate. Data on actual house- 
hold expenditures are based on surveys that are several years old and that do 
not  permit  estimates of  expenditures for  substate  geographical  areas  that 
played a prominent part in major reform proposals debated in  1994. Analysis 
of how people will respond to new organizational arrangements is unavailable 
because each of the major reform proposals would place people in situations 
never before observed. The president’s  plan  and  several  others include  new 
administrative entities-regional  health alliances or health purchasing cooper- 
atives-that  exist nowhere and whose effects on the marketing of insurance or 
organization of care is a matter of speculation. Managed competition, a conge- 
ries  of  market  reforms  to promote cost-conscious  buying,  looks  extremely 
promising  on paper, but it has not run the gauntlet of  legislation, regulatory 
drafting,  and  implementation. How  much  of  the  current  cost  advantage  of 
HMOs, the leading managed care settings, is attributable to superior efficiency 
and how much to rationing, selection, or cost shifting through negotiated dis- 
counts remains unclear.  In their recent review of research on HMOs, Miller 
and Luft concluded, “[Tlhe findings suggest that HMOs provide care at lower 
cost than do indemnity plans. Recent peer reviewed literature did not produce 
estimates of three other central summary indicators of managed care plan per- 
formance: the rate of growth of expenditures and the level and rate of growth 
of premiums” (1994, 1517). Attempts now to quantify the pace or amount of 
retardation in growth of spending from managed care recall Alec Cairncross’s 
advice to economic forecasters: “Give a number or a date; never both.” 
While the debate is occurring, major events are taking place in the organiza- 
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tion  of health care. A bewildering  variety of organizations  is swallowing up 
solo or free-standing  group practices  of physicians  throughout  much of the 
United  States. The range of managed care settings increases daily. Managed 
care is being born without the aid of legislative midwives. 
4.7.2  Cost Estimates 
Uncertainty  is the defining characteristic of the health care reform debate. 
For purely illustrative purposes, consider the question of how the medical sys- 
tem will respond to the extension of coverage to those who currently consume 
health care but do not pay for it. Providers now recover the costs of such care 
by charging the insured more than the full cost of care. Because Medicare and 
Medicaid have considerable market power, these programs also pay less than 
the full cost of care, according to estimates of the Prospective Payment Assess- 
ment Commission. Thus, private payers face charges for hospital services that 
average 3  I % more than the actual cost of care rendered to privately insured 
patients, although the excess varies widely from state to state. 
The vitally important question for projecting costs concerns what will hap- 
pen to charges when everyone is insured. Reimbursements  will be available 
for previously  uncompensated care.  How  will  providers  respond  in  setting 
fees? Some argue that the correct answer is that nothing will happen to the 
level or growth of fees, that total payments to providers for services currently 
rendered will increase because of increased insurance and that the growth of 
charges will be unaffected. This view implies an increase in rents, waste, or 
both unless some action is taken to prevent them. 
This projection is open to challenge on several grounds. First, the behavior 
of providers should be influenced by  the market conditions they face. Advo- 
cates of managed competition would argue that, in a properly structured mar- 
ket, insurers will sooner or later bid premiums down to offset the added reve- 
nues and then bid them down some more as pressures for efficient provision 
and elimination of low-benefit, high-cost services proceed. Others favor regu- 
latory measures-premium  caps, hospital budgets, or fee regulation-to  avoid 
what they see as the doubly uncertain promise of competition as to timing and 
amount of savings eventually achieved. 
The extension of coverage to the currently uninsured may cause charges to 
fall-whether  through competition or regulation. Especially if they do not, the 
rate of growth may abate. Rents and waste may still increase, it is alleged, but 
not by the full amount of the windfall. On one’s view about this question hinges 
projections of the effect of health care reform on national health care spending 
and on the federal budget. Given the rules of congressional budget accounting, 
these projections determine by how much taxes must be raised or other spend- 
ing cut. Given the long history of savings claimed but never realized and the 
legislative responsibilities of the CBO to prevent budgetary trickery, the CBO 
is prepared to count as savings only what is embedded in law, not what advo- 
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debate on health care reform depends inescapably on projections that cannot 
be conclusively demonstrated. These projections,  in turn, influence views on 
the importance of regulatory measures to siphon off the windfall at the outset. 
This way  of  looking  at the issue  actually  understates  uncertainties  sur- 
rounding critical details. It ignores the important variation among and within 
the United States in the estimated degree to which cost shifting against private 
payers now occurs. Estimates indicate that the excess of payments over cost by 
private payers for hospital services varies widely among the states. A national 
view omits consideration of the wide disparity among states and localities in 
the distribution of the uninsured  or in  the proportion  of patients covered by 
Medicaid and Medicare. Thus, the windfall to providers from the extension of 
coverage varies enormously from state to state. Equally important  variations 
occur within states, a relevant fact if any legislated reform relies on substate 
administrative entities; the magnitude of these variations is simply unknown. 
4.7.3  Consequences 
The lack of information necessary to predict the full consequences of major 
reform of  health care is pervasive and ineradicable. In these respects, reform 
of health care is not unique. The full effects of any large-scale action can never 
be fully foreseen. Hagiography  of entrepreneurs rests on their extraordinary 
capacities to bear risk. National  leaders  and honored  generals receive acco- 
lades for their capacity to guide nations and armies through dark uncertainties. 
The key in each case is a willingness by responsible  leaders to decide on a 
course of action under conditions others find bewildering and on their capacity 
to persuade others that the larger purpose justifies  the risks entailed. In the 
political domain, action requires consensus, which can emerge from an over- 
powering sense of  crisis or from a concordance of views on facts and goals. 
When no such consensus on a larger purpose exists or when profound disagree- 
ments exist on how best to achieve those purposes, lack of information be- 
comes paralytic. No sufficiently persuasive case for action is possible; or, to 
be more precise, advocates of alternative courses of action contend fratricidally 
on how best to proceed. Attention to principle and prudence produces inaction. 
4.8  Ideology 
All actions rest on faith. The faith is simply the inductive leap that previous 
regularities will continue to apply in the current case. Two centuries ago Hume 
showed that such inferences are not rigorously provable. When actions concern 
major restructuring  of incentives and when  information  is missing  at every 
turn, few dependable forecasts of  the consequences of  action  are possible. 
Such is the case with health care reform. The result is that health care reform 
becomes a kind of political Rorschach test in which the images conjured up by 
one proposal or another reflect and reveal the observers’ ideologies more than 
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The ideologies in evidence in the debate about health care reform closely 
resemble those  displayed  in  other political  debates.  The most  fundamental 
ideological cleavage concerns who is responsible for determining whether in- 
dividuals should have health insurance or not. Views are ranged along a two- 
dimensional spectrum. On one axis views vary on the nature of health insur- 
ance (or on access to health care-not  the same thing). At one pole is the view 
that health insurance is an ordinary market commodity, not fundamentally dif- 
ferent from restaurant  meals or automobiles in the sense that free consumer 
decisions based on available household resources should govern allocation. At 
the other pole is the view that health insurance is a right, a perquisite of citizen- 
ship or national residence, much like suffrage, the right to attend public school, 
or the assurance of police protection. 
For those who believe that some collective responsibilities exist regarding 
health care, disagreement occurs along the axis of what constitutes acceptable 
coverage-public  hospitals for the indigent? insurance for the costs of treat- 
ment during catastrophic illness? coverage for the costs of all “routine,”  but 
not for “elective,” procedures? coverage for all medical care? 
This dispute, heavily  shadowed by  views on the role of the government in 
promoting egalitarian income distribution, includes the sensitive question of 
what  rules  should  govern  the  purchase  of  health  care  outside  of  any 
government-regulated  system. Should individuals be free to use their own re- 
sources to buy supplemental insurance, should such insurance be taxed or oth- 
erwise penalized, or should they be prohibited from buying such insurance? 
Should individuals be free to buy care outside a regulated system, should price 
penalties or regulatory obstacles be imposed, or should the delivery of care 
outside the regulatory system be flatly prohibited? This group of what I call 
safety-valve questions  is among the most important  and least studied issues 
that will determine the long-run viability of any government-managed  system. 
Ideological disputes arise also with respect to cost control. Would govern- 
mental attempts to restrain growth of spending deteriorate into ineffectual bu- 
reaucratic  tangles  that  obstruct  organizational and scientific innovation  and 
that  become the  vehicles  for regulatory  logrolling  which  might  even  raise 
spending? Would such regulations,  instead, slow the growth of spending, as 
they have done in other nations, with some possible  loss of efficient innova- 
tions but with certain gains from reallocation  of resources from low-benefit 
medical  services to higher-benefit  alternative  uses?  Should one expect cost 
controls to cause elimination  only of low-benefit services? Not if one looks 
at analyses of expenditure differences among nations. But perhaps outcomes 
analysis will change all that. 
Or take the proposed health alliances or purchasing  cooperatives found in 
proposals both Democrats and Republicans advanced early in 1994. Experts 
expressed doubts that the alliances could actually be created and staffed and 
that data necessary for their operation could be gathered in the time allotted 
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cality but on principle. Are alliances necessary to remove current imperfections 
in markets for health  insurance? Or, if  they are mandatory  and especially if 
they are exclusive, would they be bureaucratic golems that will stifle household 
choice among insurance plans and physicians?  Should they be run by  people 
knowledgeable  about the health industry, thereby risking regulatory capture? 
Or should  they be managed  by  people untainted  by  such  interests,  thereby 
courting amateurishness and ignorant blundering? 
If strong alliances or cooperatives prove unacceptable, what can one expect 
from restrictions on the marketing practices of insurance companies? Are pro- 
hibitions on underwriting practices such as denial of coverage for preexisting 
conditions a reasonable extension of recognized powers to regulate insurers or 
an unreasonable enlargement of an authority that has already been abused, for 
example, by mandating coverage for particular services? Taken alone, will they 
expand coverage by mandatory issue and limits on premiums, or will they nar- 
row coverage by bringing sick people into insurance pools and thereby raising 
average premiums? In that connection, is the ERISA exemption of self-insured 
plans from state regulation a desirable limit on abusive regulation or the cre- 
ation of a market imperfection? 
I could extend this list of “ideological” issues virtually without limit. Some 
may demur that these are not issues of ideology but of analysis and fact. It is 
surely right that these issues could be matters of analysis and fact. But they 
currently are not. Like the land of the Fisher King, whose domain  stretched 
beyond the world known to cartographers of old, the land of ideology fills the 
globe of health care reform because so little of the globe is charted by  fact 
and research. 
4.9  Gordian Knots 
One of the reasons that information about the U.S. health care system is so 
spotty is that the system is so intricate and varied. 
Go to Great Britain, and one need only master the structure of the National 
Health Service system, noting that an adjunct private system has some impor- 
tance in selected areas and is growing. Go  to Germany, and one faces the some- 
what  more  formidable problem  of  mastering  the  scores  of  employment- 
centered insurance plans and the organization of the delivery of care to which 
these plans give access. 
But return to the United States, and one confronts not one but fifty-two gov- 
ernment  health  plans  (Medicare plus fifty-one Medicaid  plans)  and tens of 
thousands of employment-based plans. One finds intricate systems for provid- 
ing free care and financing it through excess charges on private payers, and a 
large industry selling group insurance to employers and individual insurance 
to families and individuals, a delivery system that contains virtually every ar- 
rangement  for providing care found anywhere else in the world  and that  is 
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financing and delivery of care may be distinct in logic, they are entangled in 
practice as providers become risk bearers through HMOs, preferred provider 
organizations,  and hospital-physician  networks,  and as physicians  and other 
providers come increasingly to derive their incomes form several sources. 
Depending on one’s ideology, this diversity is a tribute to the unique flexi- 
bility of the U.S. system and its capacity to reform itself, or it is the fibrillation 
of  a chaotic system in extremis. Regardless of one’s ideology, however, this 
diversity  is very bad  news for would-be reformers  operating  at the national 
level. Deep insight is not required to understand that the essence of national 
reform of the financing of health care is the establishment of national rules 
governing financing. But when practices are diverse, when these differences 
appear in varying degrees in different places, and when the system is changing 
fast in sundry ways in various places, national rules have geographically dis- 
similar effects. 
Moreover, the diversity of practice creates vexing dilemmas for would-be 
planners. They can try to recognize the diverse starting points of the various 
communities  and  move the  nation  gradually  toward  some  common  future. 
Given the bewildering variety of actual practices, this approach is a recipe for 
impossible complexity. Or they can ignore diverse starting points and require 
widely varying adjustments in different areas. 
The subsidy structure of the Clinton plan illustrated this dilemma. Employ- 
ers were to pay for health care up to certain nationally uniform percentages of 
payroll, and households were to be eligible for subsidies if their costs exceeded 
certain nationally uniform percentages of income. In addition, the Clinton plan 
called for the creation of regional health alliances within  which community 
rating would prevail. Two facts of geographical diversity make the effects of 
this system highly varied across the United States. 
First, Medicaid patients were to be covered through the alliances. The fed- 
eral government would fully reimburse the regional alliances for costs of cov- 
ering the “categorically eligible” Medicaid patients-those  eligible because of 
receipt of Aid to Families with Dependent Children or Supplemental Security 
Income. But the federal government would reimburse the alliances only at the 
community rate for the “medically indigent”-patients  who become eligible 
for assistance because of high medical expenses. Because average costs for 
these patients are high, their inclusion in the group used to define community 
premiums would raise the community rate and require other payers to pick up 
the difference between the community rate and the actual cost of these patients. 
The proportion of Medicaid patients who are medically indigent varies widely 
from state to state. The additional charge imposed on private payers to cross- 
subsidize the medically indigent varies commensurately. The exact calculation 
is complicated by the maintenance of effort provisions the Clinton plan would 
have imposed on states. 
Second, per capita health care expenditures  vary widely by  state, ranging 
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Carolina. These cost differences mean that the flow of subsidies under formu- 
las based on nationally uniform proportions of payroll or income would have 
varied widely across alliances and states. Subsidies to companies and house- 
holds in high-cost  states would have been  larger than  those paid to similar 
companies and households in low-cost states. 
But the effects of covering the medically indigent at the community rate are 
far more problematic. The premium increase from this source was expected to 
average roughly 20%. In alliances with large populations of medically  indi- 
gent, insurance  premiums for employers  that  now  sponsor insurance  would 
have risen more than 20%, in alliances with small populations of the medically 
indigent, less. The Clinton plan would have imposed regulations to inhibit such 
increases. The administration claimed such limits were justified because pro- 
viders would have been paid for current unreimbursed care. But geographical 
diversity guarantees that the relationship between the added costs imposed on 
private payers by the community rating of the medically indigent and the added 
incomes to providers from covering the uninsured would not have matched up 
well, even if they were similar in magnitude nationally. Furthermore, it is insur- 
ers who would have been put at risk by this pairing of provisions. If providers 
did not cut prices when the uninsured were covered, insurers would have faced 
increased costs because the quantity of care for the medically indigent is higher 
than average. 
This pair of provisions created a serious dilemma for financing of the Clin- 
ton health plan-regulate  premiums stringently and risk defection by insurers 
from certain markets, or dispense with regulations and face the likelihood of a 
sharp increase in premiums that would be budgetarily  and politically devas- 
tating. 
I have gone into this particular provision  in  some detail for two reasons. 
First, the dilemma that flows from it is an inescapable consequence of geo- 
graphical diversity. Second, while more serious than most such dilemmas, it is 
far from unique. 
When confronted with such Gordian knots, one may try to untangle them 
by dealing case by  case with the complexities, a sure road to legislation of 
unimaginable  complexity. Or one may  cut the knot, by  imposing nationally 
uniform rules and damning the uneven consequences. I believe that the latter 
course is the only one that is manageable.  But this approach  runs afoul of 
the variant of medical ethics that Charles Schultze suggested typically guides 
political action: “Do not be seen to do obvious harm.” This rule of political 
action can be suspended, but only in the presence of an overwhelming shared 
sense that an urgent problem demands action. 
The campaign for health care reform during 1994 should be viewed in that 
light. It was not a debate about the Clinton plan, or the Chafee plan, or the 
Cooper plan, or about any other single piece of legislation. It was a debate 
about the status quo. Was the American public sufficiently disturbed by actual 
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75% to 7 1% between 1988 and 1992?  Were households sufficiently fearful that 
they would suffer the loss of some or all benefits? Could businesses be per- 
suaded to fear capriciously and uncontrollably rising costs enough to overcome 
their dislike of increased government regulation? Only if these conditions were 
met would the public have caused elected officials to fear returning  for the 
midterm elections empty-handed more than voting for legislation the full effect 
of  which  could  not  be foreseen and  that  would  create  as many  losers  and 
winners. 
The job of creating these conditions fell to President Clinton and his admin- 
istration, who traveled and spoke across the United States on behalf of health 
care reform in an effort more like a presidential campaign than usual efforts to 
win support for legislation. This campaign had two themes: that the status quo 
could not be allowed to continue, and that the Clinton plan was the way  to 
change it. The public initially and in general terms embraced the first element 
of this campaign, but was divided on which of the many approaches to reform 
was best and eventually feared to make any change at all. The president’s task 
was to sustain public commitment to change, to persuade the citizenry that his 
plan was both workable and preferable to the alternatives, including the status 
quo, and to block off avenues of retreat so that querulous members of Congress 
had to stand and fight through to compromise. 
In the end, President Clinton lost this campaign. He lost it in part because 
of the enormous difficulty of the task, in part because of genuine flaws in his 
plan and blunders in its presentation, in part because critics distorted and mis- 
represented  his plan,  and in part because events ranging  from international 
crises to charges of personal improprieties  distracted popular attention. The 
president’s plan contained structural flaws and was not implementable on the 
schedule proposed. Critics charged the plan with shortcomings it did not pos- 
sess, for example, by alleging that the president’s plan narrowed patient choice 
among physicians, which was the opposite of the truth. 
Perhaps most fundamentally, however, the trust necessary to win approval 
of major reform, the full consequences of which are always unpredictable, was 
and is wholly lacking. Successive presidents, from Carter through Bush, and 
countless congressional candidates have run campaigns against official Wash- 
ington, alleging perverse  motivations  and general  incompetence throughout 
the federal government. For all of these reasons, the chances for far-reaching 
health care legislation were bleak from the outset. 
With the American public unsure of the nature of the problem, distrustful of 
elected officials, and  wildly  unenthusiastic  about the Clinton recipe for re- 
form,’? elected officials retained their preferred option-to  resolve doubts in 
favor of tinkering rather than large-scale reform. 
12. In recounting travels on behalf of the Clinton plan, one high administration official told me, 
“I have heard many things on my travels, but one phrase I have never heard: ‘We have to have the 
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4.10  Next Steps 
The trends that led President Clinton to place reform of health care financing 
at the top of his domestic legislative agenda will not change. 
Rising federal health care spending fully accounts for all of the projected 
increase in the federal deficit and more over the next decade. If federal spend- 
ing on health  care grew no  faster than  gross domestic product,  the federal 
deficit would decline to less than 1% of gross domestic product by 2004. Given 
current projections,  the deficit will reach a trough at 2.3% of gross domestic 
product in 1998 and then rise to 3.5% in 2004 and continue increasing. 
The principal force driving up health care costs-the  proliferation of medi- 
cal technology-shows  no  signs of  abating  (Schwartz 1994; Schwartz and 
Mendelson  1994; Aaron  1991; Newhouse  1992). 
Reports abound that private efforts to control costs have slowed the rise of 
national spending, but little evidence can be found to support such claims in 
the growth of health care spending as a share of gross domestic product. Health 
care spending deflated by  the gross domestic product deflator as reported  in 
the national income accounts rose an average 6.3% from 1980 through  1990, 
5.7% from 1990 through  1992, and 5.7% in 1993. Whatever their promise for 
cost containment, privately  initiated  financing reforms have yielded  little so 
far. For a further discussion of this subject, see Levit et al. 1994; Huskamp and 
Newhouse 1994; Aaron  1994. 
In the face of these trends, the behavioral responses that have caused unease 
among the American  public  regarding the security of  coverage are likely to 
intensify. Governments are likely to continue to abuse their market power as 
the largest purchasers to buy services at marginal cost, shifting overhead costs 
to private payers. Large employers and health providers with the buying clout 
to negotiate discounts  from hospitals and physician groups will engage in a 
similar  game. Both  technological  advance and  intensified cost shifting will 
strengthen incentives for employers to cut back generous fringe benefits and to 
buy from suppliers with meager fringe benefits items they  previously  made 
themselves. As governments  and companies yield to these  temptations,  the 
reach of private health insurance will continue to shrink. 
Without  some form of  national  action, there is little reason to  think  that 
health insurance coverage will stop narrowing or that total health care spending 
will stop rising at excessive rates. Restrictions on private insurance companies, 
such as mandatory reissue, limits on denial of insurance for preexisting condi- 
tions, or limits on premium variability will help some people to buy or retain 
insurance. But the net effect on coverage is unclear. These reforms bring cover- 
age to people who have higher than average expected health care costs. The 
inclusion of these people in insurance pools would raise premiums for many 
of the currently insured. As a result, some currently insured would drop cover- 
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growth of spending acknowledge  that it will take many years for reforms to 
become nationally effective. 
Despite these trends, the conditions under which health care reform could 
once again be the leading legislative priority of a Washington  administration 
are hard to  imagine. Natural  political  selection guarantees the extinction of 
candidates who revel in glorious defeats. President Clinton, having staked his 
administration’s domestic agenda on health care financing reform, is seen to 
have  failed in that  effort. Persuading Democratic members  of  Congress  to 
shoulder once again the herculean  labor of working through the complexities 
of health care reform will likely be impossible. And Republican members of 
Congress are unlikely to reward a president they see as vulnerable by backing 
legislation  he would find it congenial to  sign and that members  of his own 
party refused to embrace. 
The revival of health insurance as a national issue will await the conjunction 
of two events. The first is intensification  of the problems of rising cost and 
insecurity of coverage. As noted, I believe that this condition will be achieved 
almost  automatically. The second condition  is identification  of  incremental 
measures  that  promise comprehensible, tangible  progress  in  solving  these 
problems. Such reforms should be consistent with long-term, nonincremental 
goals, but must not, like recent proposals, promise institutional turmoil or de- 
mand broad trust of elected officials. 
Progress toward the goals of universal coverage and reduction in the infla- 
tionary consequences of moral hazard will be possible only when two condi- 
tions are satisfied. The first is creation of entities capable of administering mea- 
sures to achieve these goals. A key element of all of the major reform proposals 
is the creation of some form of regionally based, politically legitimated, ad- 
ministratively capable entity (or entities) that have the knowledge, data, and 
staff to enforce order in the financing of health care. President Clinton called 
such entities  regional  health  alliances.  Senator  Chafee and  Representative 
Cooper called them purchasing cooperatives. Privately proposed reforms also 
called  for such entities,  according  to Alain Enthoven  and  Richard  Kronick 
(1989) and Aaron (1991). 
In 1994, the idea of a single administrative entity for each geographical area 
proved politically unacceptable. Such entities, it was feared, would limit indi- 
vidual freedom to choose providers, function as clumsy and unresponsive mo- 
nopolies, or choke off financial innovation. Most of these fears were unjustified 
or could have been put to rest with simple revisions. But the idea died. 
Despite its political failure, the impulse that led reformers of widely varying 
stance to recognize the need for such regionally based entities is solidly based. 
Sponsors of alliances or purchasing cooperatives had divergent visions of the 
powers  such entities  should have. But they recognized  that freely operating 
insurance markets suffer from a variety of widely studied imperfections, most 
of which arise from informational asymmetries. Furthermore,  the bedrock of 
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cost  (which takes  the form of pricing  based  on retrospective  use,  so-called 
experience  rating),  produces  dubious  social  and  economic  consequences 
(Aaron 1994). 
Successful reform of health care financing requires the creation of entities 
capable of doing what alliances and purchasing cooperatives were expected to 
do-enforce  rules regarding the marketing of insurance, enforce premium lim- 
its, provide subsidies to needy households, and act as conduits for the flow of 
funds from payers to providers. Some of these functions may, in the end, be 
left to other organs of government. Federal legislation or state action can create 
such entities. Competing alliances  or cooperatives  can be allowed  to exist, 
without entirely vitiating their functions and purpose, although single entities 
in each geographical area have important advantages. 
The second condition that must be satisfied is the realization in practice of 
some of the reform measures that now exist only as intellectual abstractions. 
The Clinton plan, for example, depended on regional  alliances, which exist 
nowhere; subsidy payment schemes unlike those under any current program; 
risk-adjustment  payments to insurers, of whose feasibility some scholars are 
highly skeptical; and the elimination of inefficiencies that, by their very exis- 
tence, have defied previous efforts to economize. If, as Louis Brandeis said, 
the states are the laboratories of democracy, it is important to encourage states 
to undertake efforts to deal with these issues in a practical way. The ERISA 
now  effectively bars  states from dealing comprehensively  with health  care, 
because it bars states from regulating  self-insured health  plans,  which now 
cover more than half of all workers. Multistate employers have legitimate con- 
cerns that repeal  of this ERISA protection  would expose them to disparate 
regulations  in every  state where they  now operate. While it is important to 
honor  these  concerns, many  self-insured  plans  are  operated by  employers 
whose operations are overwhelmingly within one state. One approach would 
be to allow  states  to regulate  self-insured  plans  of  employers  that  operate 
within one state. Alternatively, states could be limited in the stringency of rules 
that could be applied to multistate employers. In either case, measures to en- 
able states to undertake programs that would test ideas bruited about as abstract 
intellectual principles in the debate of  1993 and 1994 would permit the next 
round of debate on health care reform to be based on more solid information. 
4.11  Last Words 
The health care reform debate should, but is not likely to, teach lessons to 
analysts and elected officials alike about the limits of far-reaching reforms in 
a constitutional  democracy based on checks and balances. Except in periods 
of great upheaval, progress almost invariably is incremental, particularly when 
legislation requires the reconstruction of powerful existing institutions. Yet the 
U.S. electoral system rewards candidates who convey to electors strong visions 
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that newly elected officials, who have just shown by their victory that they can 
surmount an electoral process that is death defying, both literally and figura- 
tively, plan with genuine humility about what they can accomplish. While rec- 
ognizing that their rhetorical reach must often exceed their political grasp if 
they are to achieve anything, officials not yet bloodied by the real-life frustra- 
tions of governing must understand that the policies they propose cannot ex- 
ceed the digestive capacity of the U.S. political system. A refusal to understand 
those limits is a recipe for official failure and popular disillusionment. 
The U.S. health care system is now so large that measures to change it are 
guaranteed to generate fierce and well-financed opposition. The media, which 
thrive on exciting controversy, not sober debate, further obstruct the formation 
of consensus about how to proceed. In the case of health care, the media cannot 
be blamed, because no professional consensus exists on how best to reform the 
current system. The era in which reform of the health care system could be 
accomplished by one “big law” is over. The task for the future is to identify 
specific modest changes that do not require a grand consensus on the character 
of the ideal grand reform, but that will nudge the system in directions regarded 
as desirable. It is grubby and unexciting work, but somebody has to do it. 
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COmment  Martin Feldstein 
Although I disagree profoundly with many of the assumptions and conclusions 
of Henry Aaron’s paper, I think it is useful because it raises fundamental issues 
about health care and health care financing that economists should be consider- 
ing. The decisive political and popular rejection of the Clinton health plan and 
of the related congressional plans in 1994 may remove proposals for the radical 
reform of health care financing from the political agenda during the next few 
years. But a half century of  historic experience  suggests that  the issue will 
resurface again before long. With health care spending now exceeding 14% of 
GDP and soon to be the largest component of the government budget, econo- 
mists should be thinking about the effects of alternative reforms in anticipation 
of that renewed political interest. 
Martin Feldstein  is the George E Baker Professor of  Economics at Harvard University and 
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It is difficult to comment on a paper like Aaron’s, which is not a technical 
analysis but rather a carefully nuanced policy discussion. I will therefore pres- 
ent a more general comment that contrasts two approaches to reforming the 
financing and organization of health care: tax and insurance reforms aimed at 
strengthening  the market  process  and individual  choice versus a nonmarket 
approach to the provision of health care. The first of these views reflects my 
own attitude.  Some but  not all of  the alternative position  is relevant  to  the 
Aaron paper. 
Strengthening the Market and Individual Choice 
Health care is not like other goods and services. Because a small fraction of 
households incur very large medical bills each year, some form of insurance is 
appropriate.’ Eighty-five % of the American population now has formal insur- 
ance coverage through private or public programs, and many of those who are 
technically  uninsured know that their medical costs will be absorbed by  the 
providers or by government because of their low income. For those with formal 
insurance coverage, patients’ out-of-pocket spending at the time of care is gen- 
erally 20% or less of the marginal cost of providing their care. This distorts the 
decisions of patients and their doctors at the time of care, inducing a consump- 
tion of medical care that patients  and doctors value  at far less than its cost 
of production. 
Although financial risk aversion implies that some insurance is desirable, in 
the second-best outcome individuals would balance the gains and losses from 
increased insurance such that at the margin the additional deadweight loss that 
results from the excess consumption of medical  services would be balanced 
by the additional reduction of financial risk. This would lead to much lager 
copayments than we now observe.?  The current excessive insurance coverage 
reflects the tax rules that exclude employer-financed health insurance from tax- 
able income. The combination  of a 28% marginal federal income tax rate, a 
15.3% combined employer-employee Social Security payroll tax, and state in- 
come and sales taxes means that many employees choose between a dollar of 
employer-paid health insurance premiums and 50 cents of after-tax spendable 
income. The resulting  revenue loss to the federal government alone is esti- 
1. Aaron’s comments suggest that he believes  that private insurance may soon  not be feasible 
because insurance companies will have the technological capacity to predict  which individuals 
will incur large medical expenses. A perfectly predictable event is not insura%le. Although some 
genetic screening now does permit identifying individuals who are more likely to develop some 
diseases, this relates to a very small number of examples and, while identifying higher-risk individ- 
uals, is very far from predicting those who will become ill. 
2. See Feldstein  and Gruber (1995) for an explicit evaluation of the welfare gain that could be 
achieved by  shifting from existing insurance coverage to plans  with substantially higher copay- 
ments. A system in which individuals select the policy that reflects their own individual tastes and 
risk assessments would involve self-selection problems that can be overcome in practice by the 
use of employer-based plans and other natural groups. Although the requirement that all members 
of the group choose from a limited range of  insurance options reduces the welfare  gain from 
tailoring coverage to individual preferences, the higher copayment plans  can still raise  welfare 
substantially relative to the current very comprehensive insurance. 137  Health Care Reform: The Clash of Goals, Facts, and Ideology 
mated to be $79 billion a year. It  is not surprising therefore that individuals 
choose excess health insurance and therefore excess health care spending. 
Some of us would like to see the government remedy this tax system distor- 
tion, hoping thereby to encourage a market in  which individual preferences 
and individual willingness to pay would be reflected in a diversity of insurance 
alternatives. Without the tax di~tortion,~  some individuals would want indem- 
nity policies with high copayments, accepting the additional financial risk in 
order to reduce  the costly  distortion  in the consumption of health  services. 
Others would join prepaid groups (HMOs), accepting the risk that providers 
will offer less than  the optimal amount of care rather  than accept the high 
premium cost of traditional low-copayment plans or the higher financial risk 
of indemnity plans with large coinsurance. The key point is that this second- 
best outcome would reflect the diversity of individual preferences.“ 
Not all economists who have studied health care accept this as the appro- 
priate goal for policy. Some of them would prefer a “single-payer’’ government 
monopoly  at the  national  level, rather  like  the  traditional  English National 
Health Service. Others hope for a sequence of political actions that would lead 
eventually to some system of regionally based prepaid health care systems in 
which all individuals would receive the same care regardless of tastes or will- 
ingness  to pay.  Since individual  preferences  and willingness  to pay  are not 
to count under such arrangements, the government must decide the aggregate 
spending on health care and then leave it to physicians to use the health care 
budget in what they regard as the technologically best way. Since all individu- 
als are to receive the same package of financing and benefits, the financing 
must be equivalent  to a combination of substantial subsidies and taxes. The 
experience with all of the  1994 health care financing proposals indicate that 
such a tax would involve a sharp increase in marginal tax rates as the implied 
subsidy at low and moderate incomes is phased out. 
Nonmarket Solutions 
Why do some health  specialists propose a nonmarket  solution for the fi- 
nancing and organization of  health care? My reading of their papers suggests 
three reasons that alone or in combination also explain why many other health 
care writers favor government provision. 
A Desire for Greater Equality. Since health care spending is a very large part 
of personal consumption, an increase in government finance of health spending 
3. The tax distortion could be eliminated or reduced by ending or limiting the current exclusion 
of employer insurance payments from taxable income. A similar and politically more likely effect 
might be achieved by allowing uninsured health care to be paid for with pretax dollars. 
4. Many writers on health care reform assume that the appropriate care for each individual is a 
technical question that physicians can answer. In reality, the combination of technological uncer- 
tainty and heterogeneous preferences means that the appropriate treatment for many conditions 
will depend on individual preferences and not just on medical facts. This in turn implies that the 
appropriate form of insurance will also differ from individual to individual. I return to this later in 
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(whether directly through the budget or indirectly through a system of man- 
dates  on  employers  or insurance companies) could  substantially  equalize 
households’ cash available for spending on other things. The experience of the 
1960s showed that voters are more willing to support income redistribution 
disguised as specific in-kind benefits (of which the clearest example is food 
stamps, a cash equivalent masquerading as a feeding program) than explicit 
income redistribution through cash transfers. 
Some health  specialists regard  the equality of health  care as  specifically 
desirable. They compare health care to votes, implying that complete equality 
is the appropriate standard. I don’t see why health care is like votes. Voting 
directs government power over others. If your vote is effective, it is likely to 
affect my well-being directly. An individual’s purchase of health care does not 
have such externalities5  The nature of voting is also such that an increase in 
the number of votes that you have reduces the value of my votes. In contrast, 
an increase in the amount of health care that you consume does not reduce the 
availability of  health care to me any more than is true for other goods and 
services. With a time horizon of a few years or longer, health care is not spe- 
cifically scarce. As the rapid growth in health care spending shows, the Ameri- 
can economy is able to expand the resources devoted to providing health care 
very rapidly. 
The ability to purchase better health care for oneself and one’s family, like 
the ability to purchase better food or housing  or education, is a strong eco- 
nomic motivator.  Taking health  care out of  the marketplace would  weaken 
overall economic incentives even if there were no change in the link between 
effort and disposable money income. 
A Distrust of  Individuals’ Choices of  Insurance and Health Care. It is easy to 
agree with the proposition  that choosing health  insurance and medical care 
involves complex decisions without jumping to the conclusion that individuals 
should be denied the right to choose. If the government knows what insurance 
is best, government experts could provide that information without requiring 
that we accept it. Similarly, government experts could indicate what they be- 
lieve is the “right” treatment for any given condition  without requiring that 
patients and their doctors accept that advice. Consumer ignorance provides a 
rationale for information, not for government control. 
If it were appropriate for the government to control consumption of any type 
of  good  and service about which  individuals  are not  fully  informed,  there 
would be few things that could not be shifted to government control. We need 
only think about how little individuals know about the food they eat and the 
cars they drive. 
5.  To the extent that health spending involves externalities, it is because of too little spending. 
We may all have a reason for wanting others to get at least some minimum level of care. But that 
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The government’s ability to make good decisions in health  insurance and 
health care is also very doubtful. The insurance coverage provided by Medicare 
and Medicaid is the most old-fashioned indemnity plan. Private industry and 
individual choice have been the innovators that have developed managed care, 
point-of-service plans, and so forth.  And the Veterans Administration hospitals 
are models of government inefficiency in the provision of care. 
An Indifference to the Diversity of  Individual Tastes. The effects on health and 
longevity of diet, exercise, smoking, alcohol, and other aspects of lifestyle are 
widely known. Some people act in all the ways that the health experts tell us 
are good for us, while most of us do so to a more limited extent. People do 
not injure their future health and reduce their life expectancy just because of 
ignorance or because of an inability to afford better habits, but because they 
find a less virtuous lifestyle more enjoyable. The same diversity of tastes for 
health and for other pleasures of life suggests that, among any large group of 
individuals with the same income, some would want to spend more on medical 
care and others would want to spend less so that they could spend more on 
other things. 
Differences in taste also extend to insurance. Just as individuals with differ- 
ent risk tolerances  hold  different  investment portfolios  and choose different 
careers, those individuals would, ceteris paribus, want different health insur- 
ance. Those individuals who want to spend more on health would also gener- 
ally want more comprehensive insurance. 
Many writers on health care seem to me to give no consideration  at all to 
these differences in preferences. Like so many physicians and health planners, 
they appear to view the choice of medical care as a technical decision in which 
preferences  are irrelevant. In  fact, there  is overwhelming  uncertainty  about 
how patients should be treated under many medical situations, uncertainty that 
can only be resolved with reference to patients’ preferences6 
The Legislative Rejection of the 1994 Health Proposals 
Henry Aaron devotes a substantial portion  of his paper to discussing why 
Congress did not enact the health care plans proposed by President Clinton, 
Senator Mitchell, and others. He offers several reasons, but his primary expla- 
nation is that the American public accepts a radical new government program 
only when the national situation is one of extreme disorder and there is a high 
degree of faith that the government leaders are trustworthy  and capable. He 
concludes that neither condition prevailed in  1994 and that it was therefore 
6. Consider, for example, the treatment of cancer of the breast or the prostate. Alternative treat- 
ments have different residual risks for the rest of the patients’  lives and different effects on the 
individuals’ enjoyment  of  life. Or consider that older people have different attitudes about the 
amount of care they should be given if they become very ill. Why should the government impose 
the same standard of care on all individuals? Why should the financing cost be the same for indi- 
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impossible to enact a proposal  that, as he characterizes it, was change on a 
greater scale than anything ever done before except the wartime mobilization 
of World War 11. 
That diagnosis suggests that a more modest series of changes could gradu- 
ally gain acceptance and bring us ultimately to a system that the public was 
unwilling to accept in one step. I hope that the public will not be fooled into 
accepting radical reform in small steps. 
I believe that most Americans do not favor the status quo in health care and 
would support a modest reform package that focuses on some of the problems 
of the existing private insurance system, including new rules that would pre- 
vent the exclusion of preexisting conditions for job changers and the cancella- 
tion of coverage by insurance companies. Indeed, these were the features that 
President Clinton emphasized in his most popular appeal: insurance that can- 
not be taken away.  I believe that the 85% of Americans who have insurance 
would welcome that reform and that many of the remaining  15% would find 
that it permitted them to obtain and keep coverage. 
But that is not what the Clinton administration or the congressional leaders, 
including Mitchell, Chafee, and Cooper, offered. They put forward a take-it- 
or-leave-it  package that emphasized  vast expenses and, in the Clinton plan, 
tight controls on government spending. Although the issues were complex, I 
think  the  American  public  rejected  this  take-it-or-leave-it  offer  for  three 
rea~ons.~ 
First, they did not  want  government to limit their health  spending. They 
might want to spend less, and they might be willing to accept such things as 
HMO plans and point-of-service insurance contracts that achieve lower costs, 
but they do not trust the government to control health care. 
Second, they did not want to pay a great deal in taxes or lost wages to redis- 
tribute income to those with incomes above the poverty level who already have 
health insurance and who would have gotten most of the subsidies under the 
various plans. 
Third, although they believe  that  no one should be denied needed health 
care because of an inability to pay, they did not want to pay tens of billions of 
dollars in taxes each year to give formal insurance coverage to those who now 
receive free care for major problems and to provide equal care for those who 
are now uninsured. Americans recognize that the care received by  the poor, 
especially  when  they  are well or have  minor problems  but  sometimes even 
when they have more serious problems, is not as good as the care received by 
the average American family, but understand that that is true also for their hous- 
ing, their food, their schools, and virtually everything else. 
Looking ahead, the interesting question raised by the legislative outcome of 
1994 is whether the supporters of radical take-it-or-leave-it reform in 1994 will 
7. These issues are discussed in more detail in several articles that I wrote for the  Wall Street 
Journal and that appear in the references to this comment. 141  Health Care Reform: The Clash of Goals, Facts, and Ideology 
now accept the more modest reforms of  private insurance or will continue to 
try to hold those popular reforms hostage to their more radical agenda. 
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